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FOREIGN DRONE CLAIMS
Lesley Wexler*
We’re bringing a case against British Telecom for facilitating drone
strikes because we feel that, in the UK, there are people who care
about human rights and protecting innocent lives.1
INTRODUCTION
What function might legal claims challenging targeted killing prac-
tices such as drone strikes serve?  This Essay concludes a trilogy of
pieces attempting to answer this question.  The first two pieces con-
cluded that domestic litigation influenced domestic executive-branch
behavior by facilitating and disseminating government answers about
basic international humanitarian law (IHL) questions, such as the na-
ture and existence of an armed conflict, the classification of combat-
ants and civilians, and the existence of civilian casualties.2  In contrast,
this piece examines foreign complaints under the Organisation of Eco-
nomic and Co-Operative Development (OECD) guidelines challeng-
ing allied state and corporate facilitation of U.S. drone strikes.3  This
Essay emphasizes that these foreign claims raise issues of potential
IHL divergence by identifying alternate legal interpretations of IHL
that might govern allied states as well as disputing government claims
that allied states and corporations do not actively support controver-
sial U.S. activities.  By enhancing transparency as to facts on the
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.  Thanks to Paul Heald for com-
ments and to Carlos Rubio-Luna and Nathaniel Koppel for research assistance.
1. Joseph Cox, A Yemeni Man Is Suing British Telecom over America’s Deadly Drone Strikes,
VICE NEWS (May 24, 2014, 7:11 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/a-yemeni-man-is-suing-british
-telecom-over-americas-deadly-drone-strikes (quoting Mohammed al-Qawli, whose brother was
killed by a drone strike in Yemen, in stating his reasons for filing a claim against British
Telecom).  Al-Qawli suggested that “[British Telecom] is a partner in these crimes, whether
directly or indirectly.” Id.
2. Lesley Wexler, Litigating the Long War on Terror: The Role of al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 9 LOY.
U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 159, 164–68 (2011); Lesley Wexler, The Role of the Judicial Branch During
the Long War: Drone Courts, Damage Suits, and Freedom of Information Act Requests, in AP-
PLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES 61,
62–64 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014).
3. Those papers demonstrated that lawsuits drew attention to targeting practices, created a
new frame to understand the behavior, helped encourage executive branch transparency, and
may have contributed to changes in the executive branch’s targeting practices.  However, in
those lawsuits discussed previously, courts played a relatively minor role in the process.
155
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ground and calling for a ruling, foreign complaints may reduce politi-
cal cover for allied support of legally contested activities, such as
drone strikes.
Part II of this Essay explains why enhancing transparency, and thus
reducing political cover, may raise the costs of allied participation for
certain activities in the War on Terror.4  While the United States main-
tains the lawfulness of its targeted killings program, allied govern-
ments are reluctant to clarify their positions on the lawfulness of
assisting these strikes.  One reason for this reluctance may be the costs
the allied countries would face from their citizens and legislators who
view these strikes as unlawful.  Foreign claims provide a visible oppor-
tunity to force foreign governments to publicly address the issue.
Part II also discusses how the identification of potential IHL diver-
gence might affect the behavior of allied countries and the United
States.5  Secrecy is a popular strategy for managing potential IHL di-
vergence, but if the allied publics and legislatures become aware of
facts on the ground that show allied participation in drone strikes,
states may choose a different management strategy.  This Part identi-
fies even more costly alternatives, such as clarifying and harmonizing
their legal interpretations as well as ending their cooperation on con-
tested activities.  If states choose the former, they may allow for
greater scrutiny and accountability of targeted killings programs.  If
they choose the latter, they could significantly alter the targeted kill-
ings landscape by discontinuing vital intelligence-sharing architecture.
Part III of this Essay focuses on Reprieve v. British Telecommunica-
tions plc:6 an important example of a foreign claim that may enhance
transparency with regard to allied state and corporate participation in
the War on Terror and the potential IHL divergence this participation
raises.7  While the OECD guidelines complaint system might be dis-
missed as a futile effort to force companies, the states that host them,
and the states that receive their services to change their behavior, I
argue that these OECD claims helped establish facts on the ground
that countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, as
well as companies such as British Telecom, would prefer to remain
unknown by the public.  While my earlier pieces noted that advocates
use the legal claims themselves to establish and publicize factual rela-
tionships to contest practices in the War on Terror, Reprieve demon-
4. See infra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. R
5. See infra notes 16–30 and accompanying text.
6. Reprieve v. British Telecommunications plc Case Overview, OECD WATCH, http://oecd
watch.org/cases/Case_325 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
7. See infra notes 31–79 and accompanying text. R
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strates a different mechanism by which this transparency occurs.8
Here, the filing of a complaint prompted an independent analytic vol-
unteer to donate resources to identify (and make transparent) the re-
lationship between an allied corporation and the United States in
regard to the facilitation of drone strikes.
This Essay concludes by describing the ways in which this foreign
drone claim inspires transparency and fosters accountability.9  It pro-
vides a foreign public and foreign legislative branch the opportunity to
better question the U.S. executive branch about its provision of sur-
veillance data and allowance of technological assistance for drone
strikes in the War on Terror.  Relatedly, it gives allied states and cor-
porations a new reason to end their silence on their understanding of
IHL, which might permit this behavior.  This transparency fosters ac-
countability even if it does not change the behavior of the allied state
and corporation.
II. IHL DIVERGENCE: TARGETED KILLINGS VIA DRONE STRIKES
In this section, I briefly explain why IHL divergence might emerge
during the War on Terror with particular reference to targeted kill-
ings.10  Rather than provide a scholarly analysis of who provides the
most compelling legal arguments, I identify how these differences
might arise and provide a short discussion of how states may choose to
manage these differences.  I note that legal claims, such as those
brought by Reprieve, which are discussed in Part II, may disrupt
states’ preferred strategy of secrecy and force consideration of other
options such as harmonization and elimination of allied support.
A. Potential
In an earlier work, I explored the reasons for IHL divergence and
the ways by which states negotiate that divergence.11  In short, the
8. Complaint to the UK Nat’l Contact Point Under the Specific Instance Procedure of the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enters. in respect of BT plc, Reprieve, U.K. NCP (July 15,
2013), http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_325/1281/at_download/file [hereinafter First Reprieve
Complaint].  As discussed infra, in filing the complaint, Reprieve spurred an independent third
party, Mark Ballard, to volunteer his time and expertise to further develop the factual allega-
tions. See infra notes 74–79.  Given this development, I believe this Essay adds to the literature R
on the value of meritless litigation, which identifies its potential contributions as “revealing facts
that would otherwise remain private: facts that expose wrongdoing that is not remediable under
law, facts that lead to other actors instituting action, and facts that lead to legal reform.” See
Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J.
1191, 1197 (2014).
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra notes 11–30 and accompanying text. R
11. Lesley Wexler, International Humanitarian Law Divergence, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 549 (2015).
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absence of a universal arbiter, the existence of heterogeneous state
preferences, the plausibility of multiple legal interpretations, and va-
ried treaty ratifications allow for state differences regarding the appli-
cability of IHL to specific events.  In the War on Terror, the United
States faced at least four categories of potentially high-profile diver-
gence with its allies, including: “the existence and typology of armed
conflicts; the interaction of IHL and international human rights law;
means and methods; and targeting and proportionality practices.”12
The use of drones, also referred to as unmanned air vehicles, for
targeted killings raises questions in all of these potential divergence
categories.  Are CIA conducted strikes problematic because of the le-
thal force wielded by civilians?  Are individuals targeted by drone
strikes correctly classified as permissible targets?  Are the civilians
killed by drone strikes lawful collateral damage?  Are drones inher-
ently incapable of the discrimination demanded by IHL?
First, allied countries may disagree about the legality of U.S. behav-
ior itself.  In parsing legal justifications for activities, allies might agree
with the United States about what IHL applies but disagree on its
interpretation.  For instance, they might disagree on how to ascertain
permissible collateral damage or the exclusive nature of IHL and con-
tend that international human rights law applies as well.  To take a
specific example:  Are strikes in places such as Yemen and Somalia
part of armed conflicts governed by IHL, or should they instead be
governed by law enforcement and human rights law?  Allied countries
might believe that human rights enshrined in UN treaties provide
grounds for challenging the community effects of drone strikes,
whereas the United States does not.
Second, allied states may disagree with the United States about the
legality of allied participation in, or support for, U.S. activities.  Allied
countries may also acknowledge that the U.S. interpretation of IHL is
reasonable and defer to it for U.S. activities but hold a different view
of how to interpret IHL for purposes of assessing its own actions.  Or,
because of differences in treaty ratification, allied states may believe
that this activity is lawful for the United States, but not lawful for the
ally to support or participate in.
In addition, the potential for divergence exists when an allied state
fails to publicly ascertain the legality of U.S. behavior or its support
for that behavior.  Although the foreign executive branch may have
conducted its own legal analysis assessing drone strikes and support
for them, if this analysis is not transparent, other actors simply do not
12. Id. at 552.
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know whether divergence exists.  Moreover, the possibility exists that
other actors, such as the allied legislature or civil society, disagree with
the executive’s interpretation and wish the state to disavow it.  This
disagreement is likely more than theoretical.  While the majority of
the U.S. public approves the use of drone strikes in countries like Pa-
kistan, Somalia, and Yemen, the majority in Britain, France, Ger-
many, and Spain opposes this use.13  Relatedly, European Parliament
overwhelmingly voted in favor of a resolution identifying drone
strikes in Yemen and Pakistan as unlawful.14  Of course, European
opposition may signal the belief that strikes are “lawful, but awful”;15
but, given the European Parliament’s vote, many also believe these
practices are also illegal or should be considered so for our allies.
B. Consequences
Does it matter if allied states or global civil society disagrees with
the United States’ application and interpretation of IHL?  One might
initially think “no” because the International Criminal Court lacks ju-
risdiction over the United States, and U.S. allies seem generally disin-
clined to publicly probe the areas of potential legal disagreement.  If
the United States can afford to “go it alone,” then the divergence
might simply be costless pluralism.
Yet, the United States rarely goes it alone in the War on Terror;
allied states and corporations often play a significant background role
in U.S. operations.  For instance, allied states may: (1) offer accompa-
nying forces;16 (2) provide access to their territory through basing or
flyover rights;17 (3) share intelligence;18 or (4) provide access to indi-
viduals.19  Similarly, allied corporations may assist U.S. operations by
13. U.S. Use of Drones, Under New Scrutiny, Has Been Widely Opposed Abroad, PEW RES.
CTR. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/2013/02/06/u-s-use-of-drones-under-new-scru
tiny-has-been-widely-opposed-abroad/.
14. Jessica Elgot, ‘Illegal’ Drone Strikes Condemned in Landslide Vote by European Politi-
cians, HUFFINGTON POST U.K. (Feb. 27, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/
02/27/europe-meps-vote-against-drone-strikes_n_4866217.html.
15. Rosa Brooks, Cross-Border Targeted Killings: “Lawful But Awful?”, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 223, 234 (2014) (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, former Dean of Yale Law School and for-
mer Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State).
16. Wexler, supra note 11, at 563–68. R
17. Id. at 568–72.
18. Id. at 572–74.
19. Id. at 574–75.
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providing transportation,20 constructing facilities,21 enhancing secur-
ity,22 or playing other subsidiary roles.23
If the United States receives support from its allies and allied corpo-
rations for its targeted killings program, how might the involved states
manage IHL divergence?  Secrecy is one of the most popular and
powerful tools.24  States may not be generally inclined to state their
position on the lawfulness of drone strikes or other practices in the
War on Terror.25  If no one outside of a select group of high-ranking
executive officials knows that allied states or corporations are sup-
porting U.S. activities, this behavior could not be policed by foreign
courts, foreign legislatures, or foreign publics.  But, given the exis-
tence of an inquisitive media, leakers, and curious third parties, se-
crecy is often difficult to maintain.26
When secrecy fails, how else might states manage potential IHL di-
vergence?  If no one presses the issue, states might simply continue on
as before.  Even then, they must know, accept, and manage the politi-
cal costs of potential divergence.  For minor disagreements, the politi-
cal costs may be low or even nonexistent.  But, for issues of high
salience for the public and the legislature, states may feel the need to
directly address this divergence.
20. E.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073–76 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc); Joby Warrick, Ten Years Later, CIA Rendition Program Still Divides N.C. Town, WASH.
POST Feb. 9, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/word/national-security/ten-years-later-cia-
rendition-programs-still-divides-nc-town/2012/01/23/gIQAwrAU2Q_story.html.
21. Foreign corporations have participated in the construction of U.S. military bases abroad.
See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A Brand-New U.S. Military Headquarters in Afghanistan. And
Nobody To Use It, WASH. POST, July 10, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/a-brand-new-us-military-headquarters-in-afghanistan-and-nobody-to-use-it/2013/07/09/
2bb73728-e8cd-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html (alluding to military facilities built by
“AMEC Earth and Environment[,]” a British firm in southwest Afghanistan, under a U.S. con-
struction order).  Also, foreign corporations have taken part in major construction projects dur-
ing the rebuilding phase of military conflicts. See, e.g., Associated Press, Punished Contractors
List, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43783-2004
Apr26_3.html (listing several projects awarded to foreign companies).
22. E.g., Simon Chesterman, Leashing the Dogs of War: The Rise of Private Military and Se-
curity Companies, CARNEGIE REP., Fall 2008, at 36.
23. Laura Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 147–51 (2005) (e.g.,
military activities and foreign aid).
24. Wexler, supra note 11, at 576–79. R
25. Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, State Opinio Juris and International Humanitarian Law
Pluralism, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 171, 174–79 (2015) (criticizing states’ unwillingness to publicize
their interpretations of contested IHL).
26. David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns Unlawful Disclosures
of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 514 (2013).
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One side may unilaterally harmonize its IHL approach through law
or policy.27  For drone strikes, this could mean the United States ac-
ceding to allied pressure, as it did in announcing its willingness to vol-
untarily limit the acceptable conditions for targeting.28  Conversely,
the allied state could publicly accept the United States’ approach as
lawful by acknowledging the existence of an armed conflict and the
exclusive application of IHL.  Either way, to harmonize, one state
must shift from its preferred option.  Sometimes this change may be
relatively painless, but other times it may impose significant domestic
political costs as well as change the scope of potentially legal behavior.
If states do not wish to harmonize, they may instead choose to limit
their interactions to avoid divergence on the ground.29  Again, for
those activities where allied support is relatively unimportant, de-
creased reliance may be relatively costless.  Limiting interactions al-
lows each side to maintain its preferred IHL approach—as is often
done with national caveats during multilateral military operations.30
But, without full cooperation from allied states, U.S. military objec-
tives can become more expensive and more difficult to attain.  For
instance, if allied states stop gathering and sharing intelligence used
for targeted killings, the United States will either need to find alterna-
tive sources with no guarantee of comparable quality information or
engage in less targeted killings.
In this next section, I turn to the role foreign legal claims may play
in mediating IHL divergence with regard to drone strikes.  While for-
eign and domestic legal bodies may be reluctant to directly constrain
the executive branch’s options, I suggest that legal claims can disrupt
secrecy by uncovering, generating, and publicizing information about
the role of allied states and their corporations in targeted killings.
Even if neither claim causes the United States to harmonize or the
allied states to cut ties, reducing secrecy allows for greater political
accountability.
27. Wexler, supra note 11, at 583–86. R
28. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Re-
marks at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security
by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011).
29. Wexler, supra note 11, at 586–89. R
30. See generally Rich Gross & Ian Henderson, Multinational Operations, at 20–26 (Oct. 25,
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2345524_code1878018.pdf?abstractid
=2345524&mirid=2, reprinted in LAW & U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE INSIDERS’ PERSPEC-
TIVE ON THE ROLE OF LAW IN MILITARY OPERATIONS (Geoff Corn & Rachel van Landingham
eds.) (forthcoming) (describing the impact of national caveats on operations).
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III. REPRIEVE V. BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLC
This Part explores Reprieve’s complaints against British Telecom to
identify the OECD guidelines’ role in encouraging transparency and
accountability of allied states and corporations.  I begin with a brief
factual background and a summary of the complaints and their dispo-
sition.  I then explain how the complaint identifies potential IHL di-
vergence by forwarding Reprieve’s vision of the relevant IHL that
governs U.K. activity in the context of drone strikes during the War on
Terror.  Most importantly, this Part then details how the legal com-
plaints uncovered, generated, and disseminated factual information
about British Telecom and U.K. participation in drone strikes.  This
information may raise political costs by establishing that the British
government is actively engaging in information sharing and allows
corporations to facilitate information transmission that requires legal
justification.  I note that these costs may not cause the British govern-
ment or companies to end their participation in drone strikes, but it
may allow for greater accountability and foster greater clarity.
A. Complaints and Disposition
As noted above, the United States rarely goes it alone in the War
on Terror; allied countries and companies play a vital role in support-
ing targeted killings practices. Reprieve identified and challenged two
aspects of this support.  First, Reprieve alleged that the company Brit-
ish Telecom fulfilled a contract with the United States to facilitate the
transmission of sensitive information regarding drone strikes between
military bases abroad.31  Second, it alleged that at the behest of the
British government, British Telecom surveilled the British population
to gather information then shared with the United States for drone
strikes.32
In July 2013, Reprieve filed a complaint against British Telecom al-
leging that its contract violated the OECD Guidelines for Multina-
31. Complaint to the UK Nat’l Contact Point Under the Specific Instance Procedure of the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enters.: BT Group plc, Reprieve v. British Telecommunica-
tions plc, U.K. NCP (Aug. 19, 2014), http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_325/1510/at_download/file
[hereinafter Second Reprieve Complaint] (“Contracting with the US government’s Defense In-
formation Systems Agency (DISA) to supply a fibre-optic communications cable that connects
RAF Croughton to Camp Lemonnier.”).
32. Id. (“Facilitating the blanket surveillance of telecommunications by the Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the National Security Agency (NSA), and other intel-
ligence agencies. This mass data collection has been openly acknowledged as a key part of drone
targeting.”).
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tional Enterprises.33  In particular, Reprieve alleged that British
Telecom’s equipment was likely to support the United States’ targeted
killings program and that British Telecom failed to conduct human
rights due diligence with regard to this usage.34  It requested that the
U.K. National Contact Point (U.K. NCP)35 investigate this claim.36  In
August 2014, Reprieve submitted another complaint renewing its alle-
gations that British Telecom’s cables supported U.S. drone strikes in
Yemen and Somalia, as well as alleging that British Telecom facili-
tated U.K. telecommunication surveillance used for drone strikes.37
The cable complaints concluded with a call for British Telecom to ei-
ther end or amend the contract to preclude information transmission
supporting drone strikes in “any . . . territory where there [was] no
declared armed conflict.”38  The surveillance complaints asked British
Telecom to end its surveillance cooperation with the U.S. National
Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Head-
quarters (GCHQ) or “at least explain the extent of its complicity with
GCHQ and the NSA.”39
33. First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8.  The nonbinding guidelines instruct companies in R
OECD countries to: (1) respect the human rights of those affected by their activities including
the activities of their clients; (2) engage in a risk assessment prior to entering a contract to
predict potential human rights violations; and (3) address human rights impacts should they oc-
cur by their own direct actions or by those of their clients. OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES 19–20 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
34. First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8, at 1.  “Reprieve submits that BT Group plc (BT) R
has breached the OECD Guidelines by: (i) [C]ontracting with the US government’s Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) to supply a fibre-optic communications cable that connects
RAF Croughton to Camp Lemonnier.” Id. This is likely to be used in support of U.S. un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones operated by the United States Air Force and CIA as
part of its “‘targeted killing’ programme.” Id.  Reprieve submits that BT should “[p]rovide Re-
prieve with clear evidence documenting . . . the human rights due diligence carried out prior to
entering into the Contract, as required by OECD Guidelines.” Id. at 13–14.
35. See generally UK National Contact Point: Make a Complaint About a Multinational Enter-
prise, GOV. UK, (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-national-contact-point-for-the-
organisation-for-economic-co-operation-and-development-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-en
terprises (last updated Jan. 30, 2015) (describing complaint procedures).
36. First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8, at 1–2. R
37. Second Reprieve Complaint supra note 31, at 1–2.  Privacy International filed a similar R
OECD complaint regarding surveillance but did not make a specific connection to drone strikes.
Press Release, Privacy International Files OECD Complaints Against Telcos for Role in UK
Mass Surveillance Program, PRIVACY INT’L (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.privacyinternational.org/
node/488.
38. Second Reprieve Complaint, supra note 31, at 13; First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8, R
at 14.
39. Complaint to the UK Nat’l Contact Point Under the Specific Instance Procedure of the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enters.: British Telecommunications plc, Reprieve v. Brit-
ish Telecommunications plc., U.K. NCP (Oct. 10, 2014), http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_325/
1506/at_download/file [hereinafter Third Reprieve Complaint].
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To understand these allegations better, I offer a brief factual back-
ground of the claims.  First, how might British Telecom fit into the
U.S. drone strike infrastructure?  Over the course of the War on Ter-
ror, the United States military created the Defense Information Sys-
tems Network (DISN), which serves as the “global fibre-optic
backbone of US intelligence and military operations.”40  In addition to
other tasks, the United States uses this network to transmit sensitive
information needed to carry out drone strikes.41  As part of the DISN,
the United States contracted with British Telecom to link three mili-
tary bases: Royal Air Force (RAF) Croughton in the United King-
dom, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and the U.S. Navy Command
Center in Capodichino, Italy.42  Each base is believed to serve an im-
portant function in drone-based targeted killings.43  British Telecom’s
cables allow sensitive CIA and top-secret intelligence, including the
type used for targeted killings,44 to safely flow between the three loca-
tions.45  Reprieve’s complaints attempted to connect the dots, sug-
gesting that the British Telecom cables were in fact used to convey
information used for drone strikes and asked the U.K. NCP to investi-
gate further.
Second, how might British Telecom and the British GCHQ46 pro-
vide information for U.S. drone strikes?  Reprieve’s surveillance claim
40. Mark Ballard, Ignorance Is Defence for Drone Death Net Corp, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM
(Nov. 28, 2014, 3:54 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/public-sector/2014/11/ignor
ance-is-defence-for-drone.html.
41. Mark Ballard, UK Telecoms Infrastructure Used to Support Controversial US Drone Oper-
ations, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (May 2, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/
2240219969/UK-telecoms-infrastructure-used-to-support-controversial-US-drone-operations.
42. Juliette Garside, BT Alleged to Have Supplied High-Speed Fibre-Optic Cable To Aid US
Drone Strikes, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
aug/27/drones-us-military.
43. RAF Croughton hosts a “command, control, communications and computer support hub”
for global U.S. military operations. Id. Camp Lemonnier serves as a center for the deployment
of both drone and conventional strikes.  Craig Whitlock, Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret
Operations, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c
_story.html.  Experts believe the United States has used this base in Djibouti to launch both
drone and conventional strikes in Yemen.  Joseph Cox, Are BT Helping Obama Wage His Secret
Yemeni Drone War?, VICE (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/is-bt-complicit-in-
obamas-secret-yemeni-drone-war.  The Capodichino site hosts the U.S. Navy’s European and
African command centers.  Garside, supra note 42. R
44. Mark Ballard, UK Drone Net Got Torture-Grade CIA Comms, COMMPUTERWEEKLY.COM
(Dec. 27, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/cgi-bin/mt-search.cgi?blog_id=102&
tag=BT&limit=20 (describing the DISN, “the global network of high-capacity comms cables that
formed the backbone of the [Global Information Grid]” as incorporating CIA intelligence).
45. British Telecom’s contract guarantees the protection of data moving through the circuit
via devices capable of encoding top secret data.  Garside, supra note 42. R
46. GCHQ is like a civilian National Security Agency.
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is that British Telecom “installs wiretaps on the United Kingdom’s tel-
ecommunication cables and operates compromised optical fibre net-
works to enable the mass surveillance of global internet and phone
traffic.”47  In particular, Reprieve relied on press reports to allege that
British Telecom works “with the GCHQ to tap overseas communica-
tion cables and also to give the agency access to its customers’ private
communications without their knowledge or consent.”48  It also relied
on popular press accounts to suggest the GCHQ shares this informa-
tion with the NSA,49 who in turn uses this information for targeted
killings.
The U.K. NCP declined to pursue any of the allegations.  In Octo-
ber 2013, the U.K. NCP rejected Reprieve’s first complaint.  In May
2014, the U.K. Treasury Solictor’s Department denied Reprieve’s re-
quest for judicial review indicating that Reprieve must pursue action
through U.K. NCP procedures.50  Then, in January 2015, the U.K.
NCP rejected Reprieve’s second cable complaint, concluding that it
would neither ask British Telecom to respond to inquiries about its
contract nor investigate whether its communications line was used in
drone strikes.51  Furthermore, the U.K. NCP noted that because
drone strikes had not been outlawed, British Telecom need not answer
for them.52  It dismissed an extensive investigation and instead con-
cluded that no evidence showed the cable was either necessary or de-
signed specifically for drone operations.53  Reprieve then called for
47. First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8, at 1. R
48. Id. at 2, 2 n.2 (referencing James Ball et al., BT and Vodafone Among Telecoms Compa-
nies Passing Details to GCHQ, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2013/aug/02/telecoms-bt-vodafone-cables-gchq and John Goetz & Frederik Obermaier,
Snowden Enthu¨llt Namen der Spa¨henden Telekonfirmen, SU¨DDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Aug. 2, 2013,
6:37 PM), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/internet-ueberwachung-snowden-enthuellt-namen-
der-spaehenden-telekomfirmen-1.1736791)
49. Second Reprieve Complaint, supra note 31, at 2. R
50. OECD WATCH, 10 QUARTERLY CASE UPDATE: OF OECD GUIDELINES CASES FILED BY
CIVIL SOCIETY 5 (June 2015), http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_4202/at_down
load/fullfile.
51. UK NAT’L CONTACT POINT FOR OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERS., INI-
TIAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLAINT FROM REPRIEVE AGAINST BT—SERVICES PROVIDED TO US
DEFENCE AGENCY  (Jan. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/401340/bis-15-86-uk-ncp-initial-assessment-complaint-by-Reprieve-against-BT-
equipment-provided-to-US-defence-agency.pdf [hereinafter U.K. NCP-SERVICES PROVIDED TO
U.S. DEFENCE AGENCY]; Mark Ballard, U.K. Officials Reject Second Complaint Over BT Link
to US Drone Network, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 4, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://www.computer
weekly.com/news/2240241667/UK-officials-reject-second-complaint-over-BT-link-to-US-drone-
network.
52. U.K. NCP-SERVICES PROVIDED TO U.S. DEFENCE AGENCY, supra note 51; Ballard, supra R
note 51. R
53. Ballard, supra note 51. R
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judicial review of the U.K. NCP’s decision not to investigate the
complaint.54
The U.K. NCP also rejected Reprieve’s surveillance complaint be-
cause it found insufficient evidence to move forward with an investi-
gation.  Because the public sources linking the GCHQ to U.S.
intelligence services relied on unauthorized disclosures of internal
documents regarding intelligence agencies, the U.K. NCP lamented
that these sources could not be made available to the parties in the
complaint and thus could not be relied on.  Therefore, the U.K. NCP
did not believe that the articles substantiated the company’s link to
the complaint.55
B. A Divergent Legal Position
The Reprieve complaints offer a legal vision that varies significantly
from the U.S. legal defense of drone strikes.  Reprieve suggests that
Yemen and Somalia are not part of an armed conflict, and thus,
targeted killings can only be legally carried out under human rights
law.56  It identified numerous potential human rights violations, in-
cluding: (1) the right to be free from torture; (2) the right to be free
from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; (3) the right to
family and home; (4) the right of peaceful assembly and association;
and (5) the right to education.57  In the alternative, Reprieve argues
that if IHL governs, the United States is not correctly applying target-
ing and proportionality principles.58  It also contended that the United
States is engaged in signature strikes that misclassify all military-aged
males as combatants or militants.59  The complaints identified specific
individuals whose rights may have been violated.60
54. Reprieve, Proposed Judicial Review of Decision by the UK NCP re BT Drones Involve-
ment (May 1, 2014), http://www.reprieve.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2014_05_01_PUB-
Letter-before-claim-to-the-National-Contact-Point.pdf [hereinafter Reprieve, Proposed Judicial
Review].
55. U.K. NAT’L CONTACT POINT FOR OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERS., INI-
TIAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLAINT FROM REPRIEVE AGAINST BT—CO-OPERATION WITH INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCIES 6 (Jan. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/402207/bis-15-88-uk-ncp-initial-assessment-complaint-by-Reprieve-against-
BT-cooperation-with-intelligence-services.pdf.
56. See generally Third Reprieve Complaint, supra note 39; Second Reprieve Complaint, supra R
note 31; First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8. R
57. Second Reprieve Complaint, supra note 31, at 10–11; First Reprieve Complaint, supra note R
8, at 11. R
58. First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8, at 9. R
59. Id. at 3.
60. Third Reprieve Complaint, supra note 39, at 5–6. R
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In forwarding this legal position, Reprieve joins a robust debate
over the U.S. approach to IHL in the War on Terror.  Admittedly,
Reprieve’s legal position is neither particularly well-crafted nor well-
supported. Unlike the briefs in al-Aulaqi v. Obama,61 which presented
a sophisticated analysis of the relevant law, the legal position set for-
ward in the OECD complaints is relatively cursory and underdevel-
oped.  The legal analysis underpinning its legal conclusions is sparse at
best.  What makes it a potentially qualitative addition to the existing
commentary is the use of a state complaint system to directly ask a
government actor (the U.K. NCP) to resolve the United Kingdom’s
answer to these questions.  The U.K. NCP must respond; the state
cannot simply ignore a complaint as it might ignore other sources
making the same legal argument.
C. Transparency
I suggest that transparency is the most important function served by
the Reprieve complaints.  This transparency might relate to facts on
the ground or to the legal view of IHL.  I offer three different mecha-
nisms by which these complaints might illuminate these issues.  First,
the U.K. NCP may order information from allied states and corpora-
tions or it may itself offer an IHL interpretation that provides some
insight into the state’s position.  Second, states and corporations may
voluntarily respond to the complaint by offering information to the
public.  Third, and most importantly, the existence of the complaint
itself can uncover, generate, and disseminate information by the com-
plainant or third parties.
1. Ordered or Offered by the Complaint Body
Reprieve hoped to use the OECD process to obtain information
from both British Telecom and the U.K. NCP.  If the U.K. NCP finds
a complaint to “merit further consideration[,]”62 the accused party is
then expected to produce relevant information in cooperation with
the proceedings.63  The U.K. NCP can also issue a final pronounce-
ment about the specific allegations.64  Reprieve sought both—it
wanted the U.K. NCP to investigate British Telecom’s behavior and to
61. al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
62. OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 33, at 73. R
63. Leyla Devarnejad, In the Shadow of Soft Law: The Handling of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility Disputes Under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL.
351, 380–83 (discussing the expectations regarding investigations).
64. OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 33, at 73. R
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force it to come forward with evidence about its practices.65  It also
wanted the U.K. NCP to agree with its vision of IHL, therefore dem-
onstrating an existing divergence between the British view of the law
and the behaviors of British Telecom and the state.66  The U.K. NCP
declined to do either.
Even so, the complaint body highlighted a lacuna in IHL policy.
The U.K. NCP noted the absence of an official British view of the law,
which rendered it impossible to pursue an investigation.  The U.K.
NCP observed that it received no “definitive statement of an interna-
tional authority on the international law position of the drone opera-
tions in the complaint” nor “any statement of U.K. government policy
on the issue.”67  The second claim also forced the U.K. NCP to ac-
knowledge several facts on the ground that the state had not previ-
ously admitted. For instance, the U.K. NCP concluded after the
second cables complaint that “BT’s connection probably formed part
of a global US military network capable of running drone operations”
and that “the US had conducted drone strikes from the Djibouti
base.”68
2. Voluntary by Allied Government or Company
Parties to the complaint may also choose to voluntarily provide in-
formation about facts on the ground or their view of IHL.  While Brit-
ish Telecom has hardly been forthcoming, it did publicly respond to
Reprieve’s complaint.69  When news of the possible connection first
appeared, British Telecom declined to “comment on rumour or specu-
lation.”70  After the U.K. NCP denied the first claim, however, British
Telecom told reporters that “BT can categorically state that the com-
munications system mentioned in Reprieve’s complaint is a general
purpose fiber-optic system.  It has not been specifically designed or
adapted by British Telecom for military purposes.  British Telecom has
no knowledge of the reported US drone strikes and has no involve-
ment . . . . ”71  While this is hardly the divulgence of records and due
diligence that Reprieve sought in its complaint, it forced BT to take a
65. Third Reprieve Complaint, supra note 39, at 9; Second Reprieve Complaint, supra note 31, R
at 13–14; First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8, at 2, 14. R
66. Third Reprieve Complaint, supra note 39, at 9; Second Reprieve Complaint, supra note 31, R
at 13–14; First Reprieve Complaint, supra note 8, at 2, 14. R
67. U.K. NCP—SERVICES PROVIDED TO THE U.S. DEFENCE AGENCY, supra note 51, at 6.
68. Ballard, supra note 51. R
69. British Telecom first responded to Reprieve’s initial inquiry by noting that it “does not
disclose contractual matters such as those you have requested.”  Cox, supra note 43. R
70. Id.
71. Cox, supra note 1. R
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public stance, which, as I explain below, can facilitate accountability
by providing a statement of fact that can be challanged and disproved.
3. Uncovered, Generated, and Disseminated by Complainant and
Third Parties
With Reprieve, the most significant transparency function is the un-
covering, generating, and disseminating of information by the com-
plainant and third parties.  Prior to the first claim, few, if any,
members of the public or British legislature knew of the potential con-
nection between British Telecom and U.S. drone strikes.72  While the
complaint has not garnered the same coverage as high-profile litiga-
tion, major U.K. news outlets, such as the Guardian and the Indepen-
dent, have covered Reprieve’s claim against British Telecom.73
In addition, the filing of a legal complaint reduced political cover-
age for British Telecom and the United Kingdom through “distributed
analytic voluntarism.”74  In other words, Reprieve was able, albeit un-
intentionally, to leverage its complaint to convince others to establish
the facts on the ground for free.  Reprieve lacked the resources and
expertise to perform a deep dive into the publicly available govern-
ment documents, and instead, relied on mass media for its allegations
regarding facts on the ground.  But, in filing the complaint, Reprieve
spurred an independent third party to volunteer his time and expertise
to further develop the factual allegations.  A Computer Weekly ana-
lyst, Mark Ballard, utilized a sophisticated open-source indexing sys-
tem and the Recoll search tool to independently75 review thousands of
pages of publicly available documents.76  After doing so, Ballard pub-
72. Both Lexis and Google searches reveal that the journalism referring to British Telecom’s
role in U.S. drone strikes consistently refer to Reprieve’s complaint and were written after the
filing of the first complaint.
73. See e.g., Kunal Dutta, Firms Re-Examine Links with BT over Drones, INDEPENDENT (Aug.
23, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/firmsreexamine-links-with-bt-over
-drones-8784299.html; Garside, supra note 42; Robert Verkaik, Exclusive: Minister in Row over
BT’s Link to US Drones’ War, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/exclusive-minister-in-row-over-bts-link-to-us-drones-war-9215364.html.
74. Thanks to Nathan Miller for suggesting this term.
75. He has stated that his investigation “was conducted entirely independently of Reprieve.  It
found documents in the public domain, none of which were provided by or sourced from the
legal charity.”  Mark Ballard, BT Asks Department of Business, Innovation and Skills to Reject
Links to US Drone Strikes, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Nov. 20, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www
.computerweekly.com/news/2240235035/BT-asks-UK-authorities-to-reject-appeal-over-links-to-
controversial-US-drone-strikes.
76. Mark Ballard, Analysis: How the UK Connects to the US Global Drone Network, COM-
PUTERWEEKLY.COM (May 2, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240220017/
Analysis-How-the-UK-connects-to-the-US-global-drone-network; Ballard, supra note 51 (noting R
that Ballard reviewed over 30,000 pages of evidence); Ballard, supra note 41. R
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lished numerous articles explaining the role of British Telecom in
building the DISN, which drones use “to disseminate mission data and
for long-range command and control” and serves as “the basis of intel-
ligence sharing between US military and intelligence agencies and US
allies.”77  While Reprieve’s complaint requested the U.K. NCP to in-
vestigate and establish the relationship between British Telecom and
drone strikes, Ballard provided a compelling second best option con-
cluding that ‘“there’s absolutely no doubt whatsoever that this [British
Telecom contract] is part of the Defense Information Systems Net-
work (DISN).’ . . .  ‘Drones use DISN to disseminate mission data and
for long-range command and control.’”78  Ballard then went on to fur-
ther document the United Kingdom’s larger role in drone strikes by
identifying and discussing documents detailing the United Kingdom’s
creation of software to share intelligence used to cooperatively geolo-
cate drone targets.79
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY
Foreign complaints are a small piece of the transparency ecology in
which drone strikes operate.  While the United States, its allies, and
corporations may prefer to act in secrecy, foreign complaints are one
way to unearth details of their relationships, and in so doing, allow
other actors to demand accountability for their behavior.  For com-
plaints such as Reprieve, states may still choose how to respond in
regard to facts on the ground and the doctrine that guides their behav-
ior, but the political costs have changed.80
77. Ballard, supra note 41. R
78. Cox, supra note 1 (quoting Mark Ballard). R
79. Mark Ballard, UK Helping US Military Build Intelligence Software for Drone Targeting,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (May 7, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/
2240220230/UK-helping-US-military-build-intelligence-software-for-drone-targeting.
80. E.g., Dutta, supra note 73 (noting that political costs can also affect the corporations as R
multiple major financial services reexamined their relationship with British Telecom in the wake
of the drone allegations).
